Sovereignty, point by point

Each customer receives a dedicated instance on a Scaleway Elastic Metal server, in the fr-par-2 zone, in Paris. The instance answers on its own subdomain, behind a single exposed service: the Caddy web server, with a Let’s Encrypt certificate, HSTS and framing disabled.

Scaleway SAS is a company under French law. The data of your instance stays on that server and in the associated backup space, also in Paris.

There is no shared platform. Your instance has its own PostgreSQL and Neo4j databases, its own message bus, its own collectors and workers. Its encryption keys are generated when it is created and exist nowhere else. Deleting an instance erases the server and its volumes.

What the instance keeps, and how.

Cloud credentials

Encrypted with AES-256-GCM under a key specific to the instance before being written to the database. The scan orders that carry them to the workers are sealed with a second key, so the message bus never sees them in clear.

Inventory and findings

Resources, their relationships and findings are kept in the instance. Closed findings are purged after ninety days by default, adjustable between seven days and ten years. The audit log is kept for one year.

Sensitive data found

The Data module only keeps masked excerpts and counts; detected secrets are stored masked. Disk and database copies are created in your account and destroyed when the read is over.

Backups

Daily, to a Scaleway Object Storage space in Paris dedicated to your instance, kept for thirty days. The credential encryption key is never included in a backup.

One: Scaleway, for hosting, backup storage, transactional email and the language models behind the assistants (Mistral models served by Scaleway’s APIs, in Europe). The assistants only receive the elements of the current finding or question, within the user’s project scope, enforced server-side.

Public vulnerability databases (NVD, KEV, EPSS) are consulted to match packages and images; no account name, resource or data read on your side is sent to them.

Read permissions are enough for every configuration, identity, Kubernetes and infrastructure-as-code module. The Hosts, Vulnerabilities and Data modules need to copy disks and databases inside your account: those write permissions are separate, documented per cloud, and you may choose not to grant them. The exact permissions are published in the documentation.

Ctadel holds no certification or qualification for itself: not ISO 27001, not SecNumCloud, not HDS. When a page mentions SecNumCloud, it refers to the inspected OUTSCALE region or to the controls of the framework referenced by the rules, never to Ctadel.

The software relies on open-source components (PostgreSQL, Neo4j, NATS, Caddy) and on open language models. We do not claim an entirely European software supply chain; we guarantee where the code and the data run, and who accesses them.

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